Such a format often will affect a player's strategy, perhaps encouraging one to seek opportunities to eliminate opponents where one wouldn't otherwise in order to secure bounties. After all, depending on how the payouts are scheduled, it is often possible to collect enough bounties to turn a profit in a bounty tournament without even surviving into the money.

The emergence of these bounty tourneys invites us to think about the inherent value of eliminating opponents even when there are no bounties for doing so. We know there exists some value for us whenever a player is knocked out in a tournament, as that occurrence always moves us one step closer to the cash or, if the bubble has already burst, one spot higher on the payout schedule. But how valuable is it, really, to eliminate an opponent during the pre-bubble -- i.e., early and middle stages -- of a tournament?

In a bounty tournament, it might seem worth going out of our way in certain instances to try to score a knockout. But in a non-bounty tournament should we ever be going out of our way to eliminate someone?

Until relatively recently, it was sometimes suggested by tourney pros and other strategists that in freeze-out tourneys with standard payout schedules, eliminating an opponent was always to be considered a positive play. Such thinking would encourage players with above-average stacks to call all-in shoves by short-stacked opponents even with so-so holdings in the hopes of reducing the field by one.

However, as multi-table tournaments grew into the most popular form of poker over the last decade a more sophisticated approach to such a question developed, with the resulting advice often suggesting that in fact it often is not worth it to go out of our way to try to eliminate an opponent, particularly during the early stages but also later on as well.

By "going out of our way" I mean playing a hand in a way that is different than how we would normally play it if not for the prospect of eliminating a player. Say the blinds are 100/200 (no antes yet) and a late-position player shoves for 1,000. It folds to us in the big blind where we have a hand like Qd-7c.

Normally we'd toss such a hand away in the face of a 5x raise without a second thought, but say we have a healthy stack of 7,500 and find ourselves considering whether or not to gamble, with the possibility of knocking out the short-stacked player having entered into our thinking as another factor worth considering.

Now every situation is unique -- perhaps that's Jason Mercier doing the shoving and knocking him out would be an especially positive play in terms of improving our chances of succeeding at the table. Then again, giving Mercier a "courtesy double-up" would be especially bad not just for us but for everyone else, too.

But looking at the situation in a less specific way, calling in such spots is overall a very poor play and should generally be avoided. Mike Caro once made this point by quantifying the reward for eliminating a player and comparing that to what we're risking to make the call. The risk is easy to determine -- in my example, it would be committing 800 more chips to call. The reward of adding 1,300 chips for taking that risk is easy to calculate, too. But what extra reward is there for eliminating an opponent, too?

According to Caro, not much. Especially if we are early in the tournament, but really even later, too. That's because the reward we get for knocking out a player isn't just ours -- it is also shared by everyone else in the tournament!

As Caro points out, "whatever value eliminating this player adds to the expectations of all players, you... will profit only the same as the others will." In other words, if there are 51 players left, you're splitting the "reward" of knocking out your opponent with everyone else -- i.e., you're getting only 1/50th of whatever value that has.

Thus if you weren't normally going to call a 5x raise with Qd-7c, the fact that you might knock out an opponent by doing so shouldn't be encouraging you to act otherwise.

All is situation-dependent, of course, and oftentimes a late-position push by a short stack can indicate an especially wide range that might make calling with an average starting hand correct. But if this isn't a bounty tournament, don't make a marginal call just to try to reduce the field by one, particularly early on. Because while knocking someone out might feel good, the extra benefit for doing so usually doesn't translate into much more value for us.

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I was reminded of this issue recently when perusing the Two Plus Two forums and noticing David Sklansky's recent article in Two Plus Two Magazine in which he lists "20 Problems With Annie Duke's Book." His list highlights various quotes and ideas put forth in Decide to Play Great Poker by Annie Duke and John Vorhaus, a strategy text that first appeared last summer.

Included in his list is a statement by the authors that in no-limit hold'em "Suited cards are functionally no better than unsuited cards." Sklansky doesn't comment on the "problem" he has with that statement, but does promise to come back later and do so with the problems in his list that inspire the most discussion in the forums. It is clear, though, that by listing the statement he disagrees with its argument.

"People overvalue suitedness like crazy"

The statement comes in a section titled "The Illusion of Suit Value" and echoes a position Duke has offered elsewhere regarding how easily carried away some players get by suitedness. "People overvalue suitedness like crazy," say the authors in the book, going on to add that if they can convince us to stop being seduced by suitedness and limping in from early position with something like 8h-7h "then your poker game will really improve and you'll get your money's worth from this book."

In explaining how suitedness creates an "illusion" that tricks us into making less than optimal decisions, the authors outline how unlikely it is to flop a flush (118-to-1), as well as how difficult it is for one's flopped flush with low suited cards to remain best by the river. They estimate "about one time in 300 or so you'll flop perfect and stay perfect."

Of course, good flops for those low suited connectors extend beyond the rare instances when one flops a flush. One can also flop other made hands (e.g., two pair, trips, straights) or -- much more likely -- draws to either to flushes or straights. But the authors argue how even these flops aren't as promising as they might seem. Ultimately, the discussion concludes with the statement "that having suited cards versus the same hand in an unsuited version only improves your hand by about 3%."

Like I say, this is a point Duke has made before. In Anthony Holden's Bigger Deal (2007), he describes a scene in which he attends a poker camp where Duke was an instructor, and she delivers a similar lesson to him after he tries to limp into a hand with 6c-7c.

Again noting the 3% figure, Duke asks Holden "Would you have played 6-7 off-suit in that spot?" Holden says he "meekly" shook his head no. "No, of course you wouldn't," says Duke. "So you shouldn't have played 6-7 suited."

Flopping Good with Suited Cards

Going back to the different "good" flops for a hand like Holden's 6c-7c, there are the unlikely "made" hands (flushes, straights, two pair, and trips) as well as the more likely drawing hands (to flushes and straights). We'll set aside flopping one pair -- likely middle or bottom pair -- as a not-so-good flop here, a point Duke and Vorhaus rightly emphasize as a way some players get in trouble with those low suited connectors.

As noted, flopping a flush is especially rare (118-to-1). Flopping a flush draw is of course more likely, about 8-to-1. Put together, that's about 8.5-to-1 you'll flop a flush or flush draw -- that is, that flops will come in which suitedness matters the most.

To mention other good flops for 6c-7c, it's about 48-to-1 to flop two pair (using both cards), about 73-to-1 to flop trips, and about 77-to-1 to flop a straight. All fairly unlikely. However, you're almost 9-to-1 to flop an open-ended straight draw. Putting all of these possibilities together adds up to a little worse than a 6-to-1 chance you'll flop something decent for which suitedness isn't relevant.

When adding all of these possible good flops together we encounter a little bit of overlap -- e.g., some of those straight draws you flop are also going to be flush draws/flushes. But even with that you have about a 1 in 4 chance (or 3-to-1) of flopping something worth pursuing with your 6c-7c.

However, if you take away suitedness and play, say, 6c-7d, you lose nearly half of those good flops (flushes and flush draws). Your chances of flopping something good go down to a little worse than 1 in 7 (or 6-to-1).

That's a pretty big difference, actually, from almost 25% good flops to a little more than 14% -- bigger than the 3% Duke is talking about. In truth, that 3% figure refers to the relative worth of hands that go all of the way to the river. For example, in the classic A-K versus Q-Q preflop all-in confrontation, the pocket queens have the preflop edge, although Big Slick's chances improve by about 3% if the cards are suited (from about 43-57 to 46-54).

Being Suited to Play Suited Cards

All of which is to say, suitedness does matter, which is why Sklansky has a problem with the statement suggesting that it doesn't. However, I think Duke's intention is to instruct amateurs who may not be well-versed in post-flop play to avoid being seduced by suited cards and subsequently put themselves into difficult spots.

Since draws form such a big part of the percentage of desired flops with a hand like 6c-7c, you have to know how to play after those flops come. And, of course, stack sizes, opponents' styles, and position are all very relevant, too, when the decision-making extends beyond the appearance of those first three community cards.

All of which is to say, suitedness is most certainly important, but when you allow suitedness to encourage you to play a hand you might not have played otherwise, understand how that decision is more than likely going to lead to more decisions, some of which may require a bit more consideration.

In other words, if you're suited up when you go out, don't expect to play a casual game.

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Most who have played any Omaha/8 quickly learn that when it comes to starting hands, the ace is the most desired card to see among your four hole cards. In a split-pot game, there is no more valued card to hold than an ace -- both the highest and the lowest ranking card. Consult any Omaha/8 strategy book and you'll see authors without exception noting that almost all worthwhile starting hands in Omaha/8 contain an ace.

For example, in their chapter on starting hand selection in Mastering Omaha/8 Poker (reviewed here), nearly all of the types of hands Lou Krieger and Mark Tenner recommend contain an ace, with just a couple of exceptions. One is a hand with four of the other "prime" cards (i.e., 2, 3, 4, 5). Another is a hand with four "ten-point" cards (10, J, Q, K). But beyond those exceptions, they advise that you generally want at least an ace to start with in Omaha/8, and preferably three more coordinating cards as well.

In his chapter on Omaha/8 in Super System 2, Bobby Baldwin likewise begins his discussion of starting hands by focusing on the ace. Since O/8 is a game in which scooping is the goal, "the key card is an ace, and few hands are playable without one."

So, too, does Bill Boston emphasize "the power of the ace" in his Omaha High-Low for Low-Limit Players, pointing out that if you enter an Omaha/8 pot without ace in a full ring game, two of your opponents will on average have an ace in their hands. "Without an ace in your hand," writes Boston, "it's almost like playing four cards against five for each player that is dealt one."

One doesn't have to read a book to know that aces are coveted in Omaha/8. Just play a few hands and pay attention to what hands are winning at showdown and you discover that fact rather quickly. Less widely understood, however, is the fact that while aces are most desired cards in Omaha/8, there are also certain cards you don't want to see among your starting four. And while the average Omaha/8 player perhaps isn't as aware that these cards should be avoided, the aforementioned authors all do.

Baldwin calls these cards "the lowest form of life" in Omaha/8. Boston refers to them as "the three bandits," an allusion to the way they tend to take chips away from those who play them. They are talking about the dreaded middle cards -- sevens, eights, and nines.

If you think about it even a little, it should make sense to realize that in split-pot games where the highest and lowest hands are rewarded, hands with cards landing in the middle are often going to be losers in both directions. However, some players -- especially novices -- fail to realize this fact and will routinely play hands containing sevens, eights, and nines. And, more often than not, routinely lose.

Avoiding playing hands with these three cards is almost as great a "rule of thumb" as is trying to ensure you have an ace to start. Just like with the ace, there are exceptions. And, of course, position and opponents' styles/actions should also always be taken into account when deciding whether or not to enter a pot. But having as a default strategy to avoid playing hands with sevens, eights, or nines is not a bad way to go, especially if you are just learning the game.

Seeing that you've been dealt a coordinated hand like 9-8-7-6 in Omaha/8 may make a good first impression, but it shouldn't. If you make a straight, it likely will not be as high as the one held by the fellow putting in bets on the river along with you. And if there is a low hand present, you're going to be at the wrong end of that, too.

Even those A-2-x-x and A-3-x-x hands which generally make for the most powerful starters in Omaha/8 are often made much less valuable if they contain one of these unwanted middle cards.

A-2-3-K, for example, can be an especially profitable hand in Omaha/8, especially if suited or double-suited. But replacing that three with a nine to play A-2-9-K makes the hand much less desirable -- indeed turning your powerful four-card starter into what is essentially a vulnerable three-card hand.

As noted, there are exceptions to this advice to avoid sevens, eights, and nines. Omaha/8 can be an especially situational game, meaning your opponents' styles should have a lot to do with how you make those preflop decisions.

But if you see them routinely committing chips with hands containing sevens, eights, and nines, that should indicate to you there's probably something lacking in their understanding of hand values in Omaha/8. And by avoiding playing hands with sevens, eights, and nines yourself, you're much more likely to gain an edge against those who do.

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For example, some running backs and returners are better at using their blockers than others, having the patience to allow their teammates to run interference ahead of them and thus enable them to gain more yardage than they could on their own. Being fast enough to outrun tacklers or big enough to avoid being brought down are both good qualities, but so is having the presence of mind to see the entire field and allow your teammates to help you with their blocks as you carry the ball.

"Blockers" is a poker term, too, referring to cards you hold in your hand that effectively "block" your opponent from making possible hands. It is an especially useful concept to know in pot-limit Omaha, but it comes up now and then in no-limit hold'em, too. Indeed, understanding what blockers are and how to use them can be of great help when trying to narrow your opponents' range of possible hands.

One place in hold'em where the idea of blockers is worth considering is when you get involved in a preflop raising war with a single opponent and you hold a hand that contains cards that would normally be considered as part of your opponent's range.

The most common example of this would be when you hold a hand like Ah-Kh and raise, then find an opponent reraising you and looking as though he's ready to get it all in before the flop. Let's say he's a tight player whom you know for certain never four-bets without holding A-A, K-K, or Q-Q.

There are six possible ways to make a pocket pair, so that means you've narrowed his range to a tiny sliver of the 1,326 possible combos in hold'em -- just 18 of them. But in fact you have "blockers" to no less than six of those hands (Ah-As, Ah-Ad, Ah-Ac, Kh-Ks, Kh-Kd, Kh-Kc). That actually reduces the chances you're being crushed by A-A or K-K by half.

The idea of "blockers" can be useful to consider after the flop as well. Say you've opened from late position with J-J and gotten a single caller, then the flop comes Q-10-4. Your opponent check-calls, then checks after a 9 falls on the turn.

As you consider your opponent's calling range preflop, then narrow it a bit after he calls your c-bet, you now are contemplating the possibility of his having flopped a straight draw. However, having two jacks in your hand considerably reduces the likelihood that he has K-J or J-8 here. Your jacks are "blockers" to his having made a straight, thus helping you reduce his range of possible hands.

The same idea can apply when a river card completes a possible flush yet you hold the ace of that suit. For instance, say you raise preflop with As-Kh, someone calls your bets after a 2h-Ks-8c flop and 4s turn, then bets into you when the 9s falls on the river.

One hand your opponent might be representing here is a spade flush, yet the As in your hand and the Ks on the board tell you that in order for him to have gotten there he had to have called your preflop raise with no better than Q-x of spades. He could have it, of course, but these "blockers" enable you to entertain other non-flush hands as more likely holdings for your opponent.

The concept of "blockers" actually comes up much more frequently in pot-limit Omaha where you hold four cards rather than two, and thus have a better chance of having cards in your hand that prevent your opponents from completing draws.

For example, if you have J-J-8-8 and the flop comes 10-7-2, the eights in your hand function as "blockers" to an opponent drawing to a straight. Or say you hold Kd-Ks-7h-6h and the betting gets heavy following the turn with the board showing 8s-Ah-4h-5c. You have the current nuts with your straight and a small flush draw. It's possible your opponent may be drawing to a bigger flush, but if he is the two hearts in your hand serve as "blockers" to him getting there.

When putting opponents on hand ranges in NLH or PLO, many players often have no problem discounting the community cards when making such estimations. But often we forget to discount our own hole cards as well. Don't forget to see the "entire field" and take your own cards into account when trying to read opponents' hands.

In other words, use your blockers. And increase your chances of running well.

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In no-limit hold'em, most players quickly figure out that big pocket pairs and A-K are strong starters while Qs-2h and 8d-3c are not. But in PLO it often takes a while to realize that just because you've been dealt a couple of nice-looking cards among your starting four, that doesn't necessarily mean your hand is worth getting too excited over.

A hand like As-Ks-8d-4h might seem playable to a new PLO player, his head filled with ideas of drawing a flush or Broadway straight. But experienced players recognize the hand as lacking much potential, one reason being that if you do draw to that flush or ace-high straight, your chances of getting paid off by worse hands are slim to none. Even a couple of "bare aces" -- e.g., in which the two side cards aren't helping much like As-Ad-9h-4c -- is not really reason to celebrate.

As any decent pot-limit Omaha strategy book will tell you, it is preferable for all four cards in a starting hand to "work together." Ultimately you have to play two of those four cards in order to make a hand, so you'd like for each of the four to have some way of working with at least one and perhaps more than one of the other cards you've been dealt. Ways cards work together include being of the same rank (pairs), being close in rank (connectedness), and/or being of the same suit (suitedness).

Of those three ways your starting cards work together, it is generally not a challenge to recognize when your hand is suited or double-suited or when you hold a pair (or two). However, evaluating starting hands for connectedness -- in other words, for their potential to make straights -- is probably one of the more misunderstood aspects of PLO. Indeed, even experienced players might look down at certain starting hands, note what appears to be "connectedness" between all four cards, and mistakenly decide they have been dealt a strong hand with lots of potential.

Let's take a quick look at this subcategory of starting hands in PLO, all of which feature four cards that "work together" by virtue of being connected. That is to say, every card in the hand is either right next to another in rank (e.g., 10-9-8-7), or only include one or two "gaps" in the sequence (e.g., 10-9-8-6 or 10-9-8-5). In other words, none of these hands feature pairs, and while we're setting suitedness aside for the moment, we recognize that having a hand that is suited or double-suited always makes it better to play.

Within this group, then, we can further divide the hands into three smaller groups: rundowns, one-gap hands, and two-gap hands.

Rundowns

By "rundowns" we refer to four cards in sequential order -- e.g., K-Q-J-10, 8-7-6-5, etc. Such hands offer excellent straight-making potential, including multiple ways to make nut straights. Most rundowns should be considered especially good starting hands, although the lower the rundown the more speculative the hand becomes.

Be especially pleased when you are dealt rundown hands from A-K-Q-J down to 9-8-7-6, be glad but cautious with 8-7-6-5 to 6-5-4-3, and don't bother with 5-4-3-2 as you need a perfect flop (i.e., exactly three cards) to make a nut straight.

One-Gap Hands

One-gap PLO hands include hands like Q-J-10-8 or 8-6-5-4. Again, big cards are always preferable for obvious reasons, so if we are comparing hands we'll always rank K-Q-10-9 higher than 10-9-7-6. However, when evaluating such hands for straight potential, we also want to focus on where the gap occurs, because it actually matters a lot in terms of affecting our ability to make the nut straight.

It is always better for the gap to come at the bottom of the hand rather than at the top. Thus even though they look very similar, 10-9-8-6 is actually a much better starting hand than 10-8-7-6. Why? Because while both hands can make straights in multiple ways, you're more likely to end up with a non-nut straight when your gap comes at the top than at the bottom.

Not to belabor the point too much, but look again at those two hands above.

You hold 10-9-8-6 and the flop comes a handy J-7-5 -- one of those nice flops that perfectly surrounds your hand. You have a big "wrap draw" with 16 outs that can make you a straight (the three 10's, three 9's, three 8's, three 6's, and four 4's). And all 16 of those outs are to the nut straight, too! A nice spot to be.

Compare holding 10-8-7-6 when the flop comes J-9-5 -- again, note how the flop neatly surrounds your hand and fills its one gap. Again you've flopped a big wrap draw with 16 straight outs (the remaining Q's, 10's, 8's, 7's and 6's). But this time only six of those outs are to the nuts (the sevens and sixes). A formula for disaster, this.

Two-Gap Hands

Two-gap hands are less strong as starters than rundown hands or one-gap hands, but still have a lot of straight potential. Again, the bigger the cards the better, and as with one-gap hands, it is preferable for the gap to appear at the bottom than at the top. So Q-J-T-7 is better than Q-J-8-7 and much better than Q-9-8-7.

I won't go through another example here, but the same idea from the previous section applies. If the gap is at the top of your starting hand, you might well flop a big draw, but most of your straight outs will be non-nut outs. Meanwhile if the gap is at the bottom and you flop that big draw, you'll have a better chance of drawing to the nuts.

Suitedness is another factor that might encourage you to be more willing to play such straight-making hands. Of course keep in mind that when playing a hand like 9s-8d-7s-6d, you are primarily gunning for a straight with the flush draw being something you'll consider as either a backup (coming backdoor on the river) or for which you'll have blockers to someone else drawing to a better flush to beat your straight.

As our bud Pud has been noting in his posts, there's a lot more to think about in PLO. But having a reasonable grasp of starting hand selection, including understanding the straight-making potential of your hand, can give you an edge over many PLO players.

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I'm necessarily not talking about professional players who live in countries that require them to tally up their gambling wins and losses each year for tax purposes. Rather, I'm referring to any halfway serious poker player who has developed the habit of record-keeping in order to track his or her own results. When December ends and January starts, it's hard not to think about the first session of the new year as wholly separate from what has gone before, and whatever we win or lose representing the start of a new running total we'll be mindful of going forward.

There's nothing specifically wrong with succumbing to this little mental machination every January 1. However, as we are resetting our internal dials to zero and letting go of that positive or negative number from the previous year, we might take a moment to reflect on the relative usefulness of doing so. And perhaps question why it is we only seem to do it once per year.

It is a good idea, of course, to keep track of what you've won or lost at poker. In fact, if you're still looking for a poker resolution for 2012, you could do worse than finally starting yourself a ledger in which to keep track of your sessions, noting which games/stakes you're playing, the number of hands you were dealt, and your wins/losses. (And if you're looking for other resolution ideas, check out "Pud's Poker Resolutions.")

For many simply keeping track of one's results in this uncomplicated way can have a positive effect, helping show at a glance what games/stakes are most profitable as well as other useful information such as whether or not you tend to fare better playing long or short sessions. If you play online and use data-collecting programs you can collect a lot of other useful information, both about yourself and your opponents. But even just keeping a simple ledger either in a notebook or a spreadsheet can be helpful, too.

That said, there is something highly arbitrary about choosing January 1 as the day we all start over with the counting.

"When exactly does this thing called 'a year' start anyway?"

I'm reminded of a short piece that appears in Tommy Angelo's latest A Rubber Band Story and other Poker Tales (reviewed here), a characteristically entertaining and enlightening sketch titled "Data Minding."

Referring back to his time as a live limit hold'em grinder in the pre-online days, Angelo describes his method of record-keeping and how he'd crunch the numbers afterwards in order to reveal to himself what he was making per hour and thus per year. It was during this period that he found himself consciously thinking about various units of time -- an hour, a week, a month, a year -- as meaningful guides for assessing his play.

Later online poker arrived, which helped everyone start thinking in terms of what Angelo calls "the universal time unit of poker" -- the hand. From there we learned to think more concretely about how many big blinds per hand we'd won or lost (in no-limit hold'em) or how many big bets per hand we'd won or lost (in limit games), and so forth.

That revelation -- that thinking of win rates per hand was preferable -- allowed Angelo to reconsider all of those other units of time he'd been using before to chronicle his play, including per year. "I have been using the time unit called 'a year' because everyone else does," Angelo explains. "But really, I have to contort my mind to fit into that box. Just when exactly does this thing called 'a year' start anyway? January first? Says who?"

From there Angelo proposes a new way of looking at past results. Rather than wait until you've finished your last session on December 31 to find out how you did for the year, look at your total for the past year each day you play. In other words, when you finish up today, January 5, look at how you over the last 12 months (dating back to January 6, 2011). And so forth.

If you keep track of hands played and wins/losses, you can calculate what your win rate is per hand. So if you play no-limit hold'em, you'll have a figure representing your BB/100 (big blinds per 100 hands). When you finish playing one day, you look at your total for the last 12 months -- that is, your total profit or loss and your win rate. That will give you an ongoing idea of how you've been doing "lately" according to a decent-sized sample.

Rocking 'n' "Rolling"

Interestingly, what Angelo is suggesting resembles how rankings in many professional sports are calculated. For instance, the Professional Golf Association looks at events played over the last two years, giving more weight to the most recent year when awarding points for its rankings. The Association of Tennis Professionals similarly uses what they call a "52-week rolling ranking" to determine their rankings.

In fact, the new Global Poker Index used by the Epic Poker League is following a similar procedure by looking at players' results from previous 36 months only in order to produce its rankings. (See more about the GPI here.)

If you play online and use a data-collecting program, it is simple enough to filter results to show, say, only "1/6/11 to 1/5/12" once you finish playing today. You can also look at smaller periods, say the last three months or six months, to get a better handle on your past results.

However, as you perform this self-assessment, try if possible to avoid the trap of "self-inflation" Angelo confesses to -- that is, manipulating the data in a way to serve his "emotional needs." ("I am winning 44 BB/100 hands over the last week! I am awesome!") Or, by the same token, the "self-deflation" Angelo's friend Alex performs when he manipulates his results to show himself in the worst possible light.

We can all manipulate our results to tell whatever story most pleases us. Try, though, in 2012 to resolve to be as objective as possible when assessing your performance at the tables.

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However, more recently players aren't using such phrases so often, nor are they following the also-sometimes-unsound thinking that lies behind the idea of committing chips "for information." Don't believe me? Jump into a poker strategy forum these days to share a hand, announce that you bet the flop "to gain information," and sit back to see what happens. Whatever you might have gained from making that flop bet, you'll certainly gather a lot of information from other posters about the relative worth of this line of reasoning.

You might learn some handy new acronyms and/or slang, too.

From where come objections to the idea of betting or raising "for information," though? After all, poker is a game of information gathering, and so theoretically every action we make and that we observe others making should somehow be part of that effort, right?

Bet or Raise With Purpose

The fact is, betting or raising "for information" isn't automatically incorrect, but generally when players describe themselves acting for this purpose they are admitting they lack more concrete rationale for their bets or raises -- e.g., to get value out of hands they believe are stronger than their opponents' or to bluff opponents off of hands they believe are better than their own.

In truth, both of these reasons for betting are for a similar purpose -- to gain value. Holding a better hand, you bet to get lesser hands to call, thus increasing the amount you stand to win. Holding a worse hand, you bet to get stronger hands to fold, also increasing your net result by gaining the pot rather than folding and losing whatever you have already committed to it.

But often there arise situations in which we are uncertain how our hand compares to our opponent's possible holdings. Thus might we be tempted to make that bet or raise, then justify doing so by saying it helped us get closer to establishing how our hand compares to our opponent's. The problem, of course, is that there are almost always better -- and less expensive -- ways to narrow your opponent's range of hands than by betting or raising.

Paying Less for Information

For example, let's say we're in a no-limit hold'em cash game and are dealt 8h-8s in late position. It folds to us, we raise, and only the big blind calls. The flop comes Kd-7c-6d and our opponent comes out firing with a three-quarter-pot-sized bet.

We're in that zone of uncertainty, not really knowing for sure if we are ahead or behind. It might occur to us to raise here to see how our opponent responds. However, just a moment's thought should show us that if our opponent does anything other than fold to our raise, we haven't gained much more information at all about what he might have.

In fact, if our opponent calls or raises in response to our raise, the only information we really will learn is that we don't like our pocket eights very much anymore. And probably still won't, regardless of what the turn brings.

If we decide against folding to the big blind's flop bet, calling is a much cheaper way of gathering information than is raising. Having position, we'll get to see what our opponent does after the turn card falls. If he bets again, we can be fairly certain we're behind and can now decide if we want to fold or bluff-raise. In other words, we obtained our desired "information" on the flop by calling instead of raising, and have saved ourselves some money in the process.

Get Information, Then Bet (Not Vice-Versa)

But if he checks, we can use the knowledge of his having bet the flop then checked the turn after our call to try to narrow his range and decide how to proceed. If we decide to bet here on the turn after his check, the decision again should be based on our betting for value (thinking we're best) or as a bluff (thinking we're behind but can nonetheless induce a fold). Again, we don't really want just to be betting "for information" here, either, as a call or check-raise again leaves us wondering.

Let's say in this case the turn brings the 10h, making the board Kd-7c-6d-10h, and our opponent checks. Then let's say we then put together various ideas about our opponent's style (gleaned from previous hands) and his actions on this particular hand and board, decide our 8h-8s is more likely than not the best hand, and bet for value.

Then he check-raises. And then we fold.

One might want to call this betting "for information" -- we did, in fact, learn our opponent liked his hand enough to follow his flop bet with a turn check-raise. But that isn't why we bet. Rather we bet for value, then had to fold.

We move on to the next hand, now knowing our opponent is capable of this particular line. We'll remember that going forward, using that information subsequently to try to narrow his range when a similar situation comes up.

And then we'll bet or raise with information, not for it.

As I fall into the latter group of recreational types, I tend only to play these "DoNs" every once in a while, and thus haven't had occasion to explore in depth the various strategic theories the grinders have adopted for optimal DoN play. But I have done reasonably well in them, mostly by following a tighter-than-usual approach pretty much from the start and avoiding unnecessary risks later on.

Yesterday I played one such DoN and had an interesting first hand, one that caused me to want to explore a little more fully DoN strategy.

The blinds were 10-20 and the starting stacks 1,500. I had the button to start where I was dealt 8c-8h. Two players limped from under the gun and the cutoff, then I raised to 60. My raise was enough to knock out the blinds, but both limpers called.

The flop then came 8s-7s-4s, giving me a set though making both a flush or straight possible. The first player checked, and the cutoff made a minimum-bet of 20 into the pot of 210. I raised to 140, the UTG player folded, and the cutoff called. The turn brought the 4h, a nice card to see. My lone remaining opponent checked, and I checked as well to give him a chance to improve on the river.

The river was another good card (I thought), the As. My opponent led with an almost pot-sized bet of 490, I went ahead and shoved, and he called off the rest of his stack, showing Ks-Qd. Just like that I'd more than doubled up. My chances of cashing had improved considerably -- indeed I had already tripped up over 3,000, which even your slower math student can figure out is going to be more than the average stack for the five winners.

Of course, I couldn't simply fold my way to the money. Not this early. I ended up having to do my share of blind-stealing and small-pot-grabbing in order to maintain my stack through the several levels the tourney lasted, and ultimately did make it to the money. But as I say, my good fortune on the first hand got me thinking a little more consciously about survival techniques in DoNs.

Early Stage (9-10 players left)

During the first couple of levels when everyone is deep, there's little cause to invite much risk. I played my pocket eights hand with reasonable caution, although things obviously worked out well for me with an especially cooperative set of community cards. Meanwhile my opponent made several unnecessarily chancy moves, calling raises from out of position, then getting aggressive on the river with less than the nuts.

In fact, you'll often encounter one or two (or more) such types in these DoNs -- players who aren't going to be patient and wait for big hands and thus will be apt to donate their stacks to those who are. Double-or-Nothing SNGs actually attract a lot of novices who see a payout schedule in which 50% of players cash as a low-risk event, yet nonetheless bring what amounts to a high-risk style to the tournament.

No need for such craziness early on, though. Tight really is right during the first few levels in DoNs. Unless, that is, you've turned eights full. ;)

Middle Stage (7-8 players left)

Once two players have busted, most of those remaining will likely still be hovering around the starting stack while a couple will have around twice that. Avoiding tangling with the big stacks is generally a good idea, although pay attention to the player type -- he may well have gone into folding mode after winning his chips and thus may not be such a threat if you challenge him.

Everyone is now looking to survive three more eliminations. This is essentially like the bubble in an multi-table tournament, where blinds/antes can (and should) be readily stolen. By now you should have at least some idea about which players are tighter and more likely to give up to preflop raises, so target accordingly. Also use position, raising from the hijack, cutoff, or button when given the opportunity to do so.

Meanwhile, calling others' preflop raises with speculative hands is a big no-no. That's true from the start of the DoN, actually, but here in the middle stage it is especially bad to do as even just one such call followed by a fold to a continuation-bet can sink you into short-stacked status, relatively speaking.

Late Stage (6 players left)

When six are left -- the true bubble -- everyone knows one more elimination equals a cash. Often one or two players will have significantly more chips than the rest at this stage, meaning most are likely sitting on stacks of 10-12 big blinds or less (depending on the structure). That is to say, there probably isn't a lot of room for post-flop maneuvering from this point forward.

If you're one of the big stacks (i.e., if you have 3x the starting stack or more), you are now in a spot where folding to the money is not a bad course of action. However, if you are part of the group still battling with 1-2x the starting stack (or less), you have to play poker.

You can still steal blinds/antes here, although the likely method for doing so will be with an all-in opening raise. The risk of ruin means most will tighten up to all but the toppermost of their calling ranges (pairs and big aces). Thus will a late-position shove often work against players sitting in the blinds with stacks comparable to yours.

Looking at it from the other side, you should probably never call another player's all-in shove here except with the biggest hands. Even though your opponent's raising range can be wide -- and thus you might well be ahead with, say, your K-J-suited or the like -- the reward for doubling up at this stage is actually not as great as the risk of busting.

In fact that idea essentially holds true for the entire sit-n-go. Doubling up is nice, but often doesn't assure anything. To go back to my DoN from yesterday, doubling my stack on the first hand was great, but there was still work to do. Meanwhile, as my poor opponent experienced, busting definitely assures something -- you've lost your buy-in.

Fifth is as Good as First

Of course, this is poker -- we can't avoid risk entirely. For example, what if my opponent had reraised me all-in following that 8s-7s-4s flop? I'm likely ahead with my set of eights, though it's possible I could be as much as a 2-to-1 dog (against a flopped flush or straight). In any case, I'm not going away.

But for the most part, situations where it is clear you are "flipping" are largely to be avoided in DoNs, especially in the middle and late stages. Remember, you win as much for finishing fifth as you do for finishing first. Why should you take a 50-50 flip with six players left when you can still fold and let two other players take such a chance?

To put it another way, a "double-or-nothing" strategy isn't really what you want to have when playing a double-or-nothing tournament. If that's how you want to play, stay away from DoNs, head over to the roulette wheel, and put your chips on red or black.

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